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  2The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and a diverse team of partners  were tasked by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) to contribute to the conceptualization and 
development of their Rural Poverty and Environment (RPE) programme related to Compensation and 
Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) by providing an overview of relevant developments in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, a global synthesis of results and recommendations. Truly global in 
nature, the CRES Scoping Study was undertaken by the following partners and collaborators based 
in 7 countries across 4 continents. 
 
African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) is a Nairobi-based international intergovernmental 
science, technology and environmental policy think-tank that generates and disseminates new 
knowledge through policy analysis, capacity building and outreach. The Centre strives to rationalize 
scientific and technological information to enable African countries make effective policy choices for 
improved living standards. ACTS works with partners and networks including academic and research 
institutions, national governments, UN bodies, regional and international processes and NGOs. ACTS' 
research and capacity building activities are organized in five programmatic areas: Biodiversity and 
Environmental Governance; Energy and Water Security; Agriculture and Food Security; Cross-Cutting 
Issues; and Science and Technology Literacy. Its members include the Governments of Kenya, 
Malawi, Malta, Uganda and Ghana, as well as the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and the Third 
World Academy of Sciences (TWAS). www.acts.co.ke
 
 
Corporación Grupo Randi Randi  (CGRR) is a non profit corporation, whose mission is to build and 
motivate equitable development and a healthy environment, stimulating the imagination, creativity and 
the talent of our collaborators, incorporating gender, generation and ethnic equality, local participation, 
the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity. CGRR was 
legalized in Ecuador in 2000, currently has 17 members, and operates a range of research and 
development projects, with international and national funding, ranging from participatory watershed 
management, watershed inventories and modeling, gender and environment, community conservation, 
conservation planning for protected areas and integrated crop management for sustainable 
development. CGRR is a member of the Consorcio para el Desarrollo Sostenible en los Andes, 
CONDESAN, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Ecuadorian 
association of environmental NGOs, CEDENMA, and is a founding member of RISAS, a national 
network focused on the study and promotion of environmental services research and action. Further 
information on CGRR is available on the website www.randirandi.org
 
 
Forest Trends is an international non-profit organization that works to expand the value of forests to 
society; to promote sustainable forest management and conservation by creating and capturing market 
values for ecosystem services; to support innovative projects and companies that are developing these 
new markets; and to enhance the livelihoods of local communities living in and around those forests. 
We analyze strategic market and policy issues, catalyze connections between forward-looking 
producers, communities and investors, and develop new financial tools to help markets work for 





                                                                 
  3Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC)   is an All India Institute for Interdisciplinary 
Research and Training in the Social Sciences, established in 1972 by the late Professor V K R V Rao. 
It is registered as a Society under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, to create a blend of 
field-oriented empirical research and advances in social science theories leading to better public policy 
formulation. Its mission is to conduct interdisciplinary research in analytical and applied areas of social 
sciences, encompassing diverse aspects of development; to assist both central and state governments by 
undertaking systematic studies of resource potential, identifying factors influencing growth and 
examining measures for reducing poverty and to establish fruitful contacts with other institutions and 
scholars engaged in social science research through collaborative research programmes and seminars, 




The World Conservation Union  (IUCN): Founded in 1948, IUCN brings together States, 
Government agencies and a diverse range of NGOs in a unique partnership with over 1,000 members 
spread across some 150 countries. As a Union IUCN seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies 
throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of 
natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable. www.iucn.org
 
 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the voice for the environment in the 
United Nations system. It is an advocate, educator, catalyst and facilitator, promoting the wise use of 
the planet's natural assets for sustainable development. UNEP's mission is "to provide leadership and 
encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and 
peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations."  www.unep.org
 
 
The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) is the international leader in the science and practice of 
integrating ‘working trees’ on small farms and in rural landscapes. We have invigorated the ancient 
practice of growing trees on farms, using innovative science for development to transform lives and 
landscapes. The World Agroforestry Centre is one of the 15 centers supported by the Consultative 
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  5Abstract 
This is the first of a series of nine papers exploring the state of the science and practice of 
compensation and rewards for environmental services in the developing world. This study has 
been undertaken to address key questions about the impact and future prospects of 
compensation and rewards for ecosystem services, and the potential role of research and policy 
engagement in helping to make these instruments more beneficial to the poor in the developing 
world. The papers resulting from this study have been prepared by an international group of 
authors as part of a pan-tropical scoping study for the Rural Poverty and Environment 
Programme of the International Development Research Centre of Canada. All of the papers 
focus on the frontiers between the ecosystems that underlie rural livelihoods, the 
environmental services that those ecosystems generate, and the human well-being of rural 
populations.  
This introductory paper begins with a review of the recent historical development of 
compensation and reward mechanisms within a broader context of changing approaches to 
conservation and environmental policy. Conservation approaches have moved from a sole 
focus on protected areas, to integrated conservation and development projects, to landscape 
management approaches, and now, consideration of conservation contracts. At roughly the 
same time, there has been a general relaxation of government enforcement of environmental 
regulations towards more multi-stakeholder forms of governance in which non-governmental 
and international organizations play roles and a variety of market-based and negotiation 
approaches have come to the fore. That dynamic context is fostering greater interest in 
mechanisms for compensation and reward for environmental services in the developing 
regions of the world. Later sections of the paper clarify key concepts and present a conceptual 
framework for characterizing different types of mechanisms and the internal and external 
factors affecting those mechanisms. The penultimate section summarizes experience and 
perceptions of compensation and reward for environmental services. The concluding section 
postulates the alternative motivations that are shaping compensation and reward mechanisms 
in the developing world. 
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financial and intellectual support of the International Development Research Centre of Canada 
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  7Preface 
From the beginning of 2006 until March 2007, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) led a 
consortium of organizations and individuals from around the world in a pan-tropical scoping study of 
Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES).  The scoping study was 
commissioned by the Rural Poverty and Environment Programme of the International Development 
Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) to identify critical issues affecting the development, operation, 
impacts and institutionalization of mechanisms linking beneficiaries of ecosystem services with 
stewards of those ecosystems. Particular attention is paid to the potential for CRES to alleviate or 
exacerbate the multiple dimensions of poverty: rights to productive assets, streams of income and 
consumption, and vulnerability to shocks.   
  
The scoping study included a series of regional workshops held in Latin America (Quito, Ecuador), 
Asia (Bangalore, India) and Africa (Nairobi, Kenya). Participants presented and discussed practical 
CRES experiences from across the developing world, experiences which informed and challenged the 
development of several cross-cutting issue papers. A series of nine working papers have been prepared 
to summarize the results of the scoping study, including an introductory paper, three regional workshop 
reports, and five issue papers on key topics.   
 
ICRAF Working paper 32 – Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing 
World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison. 
ICRAF Working paper 33 – Report on the Latin American Regional Workshop on Compensation for 
Environmental Services and Poverty Alleviation in Latin America. 
ICRAF Working paper 34 – Asia Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystems Services. A 
component of the global scoping study on compensation for ecosystem services. 
ICRAF Working paper 35 – African Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystem Services (CES).  
ICRAF Working paper 36 – Exploring the inter-linkages among and between Compensation and Rewards 
for Ecosystem Services (CRES) and human well-being: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 1.  
ICRAF Working paper 37 – Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward 
mechanisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 2. 
ICRAF Working paper 38 – The conditions for effective mechanisms of Compensation and Reward for 
Environmental Services (CRES): CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 3. 
ICRAF Working paper 39 – Organization and governance for fostering pro-poor Compensation for 
Environmental Services: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4. 
ICRAF Working paper 40 – How important will different types of Compensation and Reward 
Mechanisms be in shaping poverty & ecosystem services across Africa, Asia & Latin America over the 
next two decades? CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 5. 
 
The working papers are designed for relatively limited circulation of preliminary material. We 
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  101. Introduction 
The importance of ecosystems to human societies has long been recognized for the production 
of the many and varied ecosystems services upon which life is based. Ecosystems provide 
products of direct value to people – food, fiber and fuel – and also an array of indirect benefits 
– water filtration, climate regulation, nutrient cycling, pollination, pest control and disease 
regulation – that support and promote the natural  resource base upon which economic 
activities are founded. Healthy ecosystems are particularly important to the rural poor of the 
developing world, people who often live in very close connection to their natural surrounding. 
While the rural poor tend to derive large portions of their livelihoods from terrestrial and 
aquatic ecosystems, they also tend to be very vulnerable to deterioration in those ecosystems 
and the services that those ecosystems provide. Despite the importance of ecosystem services 
to poverty reduction, sustainable livelihoods and economic development, ecosystems and their 
constituent goods and services continue to decline at alarming rates. The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) (2005) has helped to clarify the linkages between ecosystems, 
the benefits that people derive from those ecosystems, and human well-being, as well as the 
magnitude and global nature of the degradation of ecosystems. 
A major reason for the rapid decline in ecosystems is that many ecosystem services are not 
priced or assigned value by the prevailing paradigms of production, exchange and regulation. 
While there are markets for many of the ‘provisioning’ ecosystem services, there tend to be 
very incomplete or missing markets for ‘regulating’, ‘supporting’ and ‘cultural’ services. 
Reasons for market failure are well known to students of economics: many of these services 
have the attributes of economic public goods or are highly influenced by environmental 
externalities. Many cultural services have public good characteristics: they are non-rival in 
consumption (meaning that one person’s consumption of the good does not affect another 
person’s ability to consume the product) and non-excludible (impossible or very costly to 
exclude free riders). On the other hand, many of the regulatory services of ecosystems, such as 
water filtration, are highly influenced by positive or negative externalities: the behaviour of an 
upland agro-processor affects the quality of water available to downstream residents.  
Societies have devised a number of public policy instruments to cope with market failures. 
Some of these instruments, particularly regulatory, property rights, and financial instruments, 
  11have been used for environmental governance for many years. Most of these instruments are 
implemented in a top-down rigid manner, earning them the name ‘hard policy instruments’. 
Over the last twenty to thirty years, a variety of new environmental policy instruments have 
been devised and implemented. Most of these instruments are more flexible and subject to 
negotiation, multi-stakeholder dialog, and based on market principles of efficiency, earning 
them the names ‘soft policy instruments’ or ‘market-based instruments’. The following short 
paragraphs provide a quick overview of these instruments. Later sections of the paper address 
some of these in more detail.  
Regulatory instruments have been a mainstay of the ‘command-and-control’ approach to 
environmental management for many years, setting and enforcing uniform minimum standards 
of technology or performance for all firms (Stavins 2002, p.1). Regulatory systems include 
rules, systems to modify rules as needed, and mechanisms for their enforcement. Regulations 
can be distinguished by what they proscribe: the use or non-use of specific technologies, 
environmental outcomes from specific activities, or environmental outcomes from firms or 
industries.  
Property rights instruments have long been used by governments to pursue combinations of 
economic, social and environmental objectives, including state ownership and management of 
critical resources as well as systems to register and enforce more secure property rights for 
individuals or groups. Conservation and environmental easements are property rights 
instruments that are specifically designed to advance environmental policy objectives. 
Conditional forestry co-management, in which communities or user groups gain conditional 
limited rights to forests in exchange for following specific management plans, are another new 
property rights instrument. 
Communicative instruments use selective communication to persuade and advocate certain 
types of behaviour. Public systems for extension of information about soil and water 
conservation have been a mainstay of rural environmental management in the developing 
world for many years. Public disclosure and shaming are often the main instruments available 
to non-governmental organizations. Private firms invest heavily in advertising and often 
undertake investments in public environmental management in order to be able to advertise 
that they are good corporate citizens.  
  12Financial instruments use financial incentives to reduce environment-damaging activity or 
enhance environment-friendly activity. Financial incentives include taxes and subsidies on 
inputs, information, outputs or economic activity; fines on prohibited activity, and investments 
in social or physical assets. Financial instruments with an environmental focus include 
subsidies or tax relief for the use of clean technology and sharing of eco-tourism revenue with 
communities impacting on protected areas. 
Tradeable permit or credit systems establish limits or ‘caps’ on the allowable levels of total 
resource use or pollution emissions, allocate permits or credits to portions of those caps, and 
facilitate banking or trading of the permits. Cap-and-trade systems have been established to 
manage water allocation and to limit water and air pollution. Trading in SO2 emissions in the 
United States has been the largest cap-and-trade system, but now is being eclipsed by 
international carbon dioxide trading schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
Voluntary environmental management systems such as the EU’s Environmental Management 
and Audit system and the ISO14001 standards encourage industries to operate more 
responsibly. These systems require firms to audit the environmental impacts of their 
operations, establish internal audit systems to manage and minimize their impacts, and 
regularly issue stakeholders with a report. Firms that participate in these schemes are given 
logos by relevant authorities to use in their advertisements (Jordan, Wurzel and Breuckner 
2003). There are multiple ways in which companies may recoup the benefits of following such 
schemes: attracting consumers, investors or workers to their companies. They may also be able 
to forestall or prepare their businesses for environmental regulations. 
Eco-labelling is part of a larger trend, particularly in Europe, of ethical consumption, in which 
consumers are provided with information about the production processes, returns to producers, 
and environmental impacts of the products that they buy. The OECD recognizes three types of 
eco-labels: (1) a Type 1 label refers to the environmental quality of the product compared to 
the rest of the products, with a third-party certification scheme that is often government 
supported; (2) a Type 2 label is a one-way communication from producers to consumers, 
making a claim for the product; and (3) a Type 3 label uses pre-set indices and gives quantified 
information about products that are independently verified (Gallastegui 2002). Tropical 
  13products most influenced by these mechanisms are forest products (Stringer 2006), coffee 
(Muradian and Pelupessy 2005) and eco-tourism.  
Environmental offset schemes are voluntary or mandatory arrangements in which firms, 
industries or national governments offset unavoidable environmental damage in one location 
with investments in environmental conservation in another location. Carbon and biodiversity 
are the main focus of offset programmes at present. The Wetland Mitigation Banking 
operating in the United States is an advanced model of an offset scheme.  
Negotiated agreements between government and industry are very common in Europe and 
becoming more common in developing countries as the environment agencies try to enact new 
environmental laws (Jordan, Wurzel and Breuckner 2003). 
Self-negotiated deals or facilitated agreements between ecosystem stewards and environmental 
service beneficiaries
1 are one of the newer contractual instruments, mostly involving water 
utilities or large water users making conditional payments to upland farmers who maintain or 
restore land cover consistent with good water quality. Latin America has been particularly 
receptive to these mechanisms, with working mechanisms established in Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and other countries (Pagiola, Arcenas and Platais 2005). 
The terms ‘payment for environmental services’ and ‘payment for ecosystem services’ have 
been widely used to describe new types of flexible environmental policies, voluntary 
agreements and contractual instruments that have emerged in the developing world over the 
two last decades. Wunder (2005, p. 9) provided a narrow definition of payment for 
environmental service as “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental service 
(or a land use likely to secure that service) is being bought by a (minimum one) buyer from a 
(minimum one) seller, if and only if the environmental service provider secures the 
environmental service provision”. Forest Trends considers a broader range of instruments as 
payments for environmental services, including (1) public payment schemes to private land 
and forest owners to maintain or enhance ecosystem services {a type of financial instrument};  
 
1 Environmental service beneficiaries are a subset of all people who benefit from ecosystem services. That is, ecosystem service 
beneficiaries include people who benefit from the purely private goods (e.g. food crops) that ecosystems generate, and are 
exchanged in regular commodity markets. Environmental service beneficiaries benefit from non-provisioning services for 
which markets do not readily develop because of some combination of high exclusion costs, non-rivalrous consumption, or 
significant externality effects. 
  14(2) open trading between buyers and sellers under a regulatory cap or floor on the level of 
ecosystem services to be provided {tradeable permit or credit systems}; (3) self-organized 
private deals in which individual beneficiaries of ecosystem services contract directly with 
providers of those services {self-negotiated deals}; and (4) eco-labeling of products that 
assures buyers that production processes involved have a neutral or positive effect on 
ecosystem services {eco-labelling}.  
There are optimistic and pessimistic views of these attempts to harness market forces for 
ecosystem management. Relatively conservative government agencies may see these flexible 
institutions as a challenge to their hegemony and simpler systems of command-and-control. 
Bell (2003) describes the failure of some new market instruments in the United States and 
urges governments in developing countries to be realistic about the challenges and limitations 
of using market instruments for environmental management. Pagiola et al. (2004) are among a 
group of analysts who are optimistic about the potential of payments for ecosystem services to 
contribute to ecosystem management, but feel that this function can be undermined if the same 
mechanisms are expected to contribute to poverty reduction. While some conservation experts 
see market-based mechanisms as a way to harness significant new investment in conservation 
(Gutman 2003), others see the same mechanisms as the start of a thin edge of ‘selling nature’ 
(discussions during the Asia regional workshop). Experience from the Philippines and 
Indonesia suggests that indigenous and disenfranchised local communities may be able to use 
market-based mechanisms to maintain secure property rights to land and forest resources and 
thus enhance their income streams (Rosales 2003). Many groups that advocate for those 
communities, however, see payment for environmental service (PES) mechanisms as 
undermining the rights and well-being of the poor. However, in their review of ‘PES-like’ 
schemes in Bolivia, Robertson and Wunder (2005) found some evidence that the schemes 
were contributing to the well-being of poor people and no evidence of the schemes damaging 
the poor. Overall, one might conceive of four extreme circumstances of tradeoff or 
complementarity between environmental conservation and human well-being: (1) PES 
mechanisms may lead to win-win solutions, with the environment conserved and the poor 
made better off; (2) PES mechanisms may contribute to environmental conservation, but at the 
expense of the poor who are reliant on those resources; (3) PES mechanisms may strengthen 
the rights and well-being of the poor, but at the expense of ecosystem services that are most 
  15highly valued by the larger society; or (4) PES mechanisms may contribute to the continued 
degradation of ecosystems, while undermining the rights and well-being of the poor.  
This paper is the first in a series of nine related papers that review the state of the science and 
practice of compensation and rewards for ecosystem services in the developing world. As 
discussed in section 4 below, we use compensation and reward for ecosystem services to refer 
to a range of mechanisms linking ecosystem stewards and environmental service beneficiaries, 
including the mechanisms normally included under the term payment for ecosystem service. 
This review has been undertaken to address key questions about the impact and future 
prospects of compensation and rewards for ecosystem services, and the potential role of 
research and policy engagement in helping to make these instruments more beneficial to the 
poor in the urban and rural landscapes in the developing world. This introductory paper 
reviews key concepts and perspectives that underlie the other papers. There are five other 
papers in the series: 
Issue Paper 1: Exploring the inter-linkages among and between compensation and rewards 
for ecosystem services (CRES) and human well-being 
Issue Paper 2: Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward 
mechanisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor 
Issue Paper 3: The conditions for effective mechanisms of compensation and reward for 
environmental services 
Issue Paper 4: Organization and governance for fostering pro-poor compensation and rewards 
for environmental services 
Issue Paper 5:  How important will different types of CRES mechanisms be in shaping 
poverty and ecosystem services across Africa, Asia and Latin America over the next two 
decades? 
This set of nine papers has been prepared as part of a Pan-Tropical Scoping Study of 
Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services for the Rural Poverty and 
Environment Programme (RPE) of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
The papers have benefited from multiple inputs. First, an extensive review of the literature and 
experience was undertaken, with emphasis on experience in Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
  16recognizing that experience in those regions has often been motivated by experiences in North 
America or Europe.
2 Second, all of the organizations involved in the scoping study have 
previous experience in various aspects of compensation and rewards for ecosystem services.
3 
Third, the authors of the papers participated in, and have access to the proceedings from, 
regional workshops held in Latin America, Asia and Africa in April and May of 2006.
4 Fourth, 
drafts of all papers were presented and discussed during the regional workshops and the 
author’s writeshop convened in June 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. The concepts and frameworks 
presented in this paper were presented and discussed at all of the previous workshops, in 
subsequent discussions among the broader research team, and at a meeting of the IDRC RPE 
group in Bali, Indonesia in June 2006. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the experience 
with conservation, largely in the developing world, in which compensation and rewards for 
ecosystem services have come to be viewed from two perspectives: as sources of conservation 
finance and as instruments that can make environmental conservation compatible with poverty 
reduction. Section 3 is a review of the experience with new market instruments for 
environmental policy, showing how those largely began in North America and Europe and 
have expanded over time from flexible mechanisms for compensation for ecosystem damage, 
to now include compulsory and voluntary mechanisms of reward for ecosystem stewardship 
and restoration. There has also been some expansion of the mechanisms over space, from 
Europe and North America to Latin America, Asia and Africa. Section 4 picks up and expands 
upon three of the themes from section 3, structured by a conceptual model of ecosystem 
services, ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries and intermediaries. One of 
the themes is the importance of distinguishing between compensation for ecosystem damage 
versus rewards for ecosystem stewardship and restoration. Section 5 explores the linkages 
between compensation and rewards for ecosystem services and the wider public policy and 
 
2 The primary geographic scope of this scoping study is given by the geographic focus of the RPE programme: the Nile Basin, 
south-eastern Africa, Sahel, Central Andes, Amazonia, Western Caribbean and Central America, Mekong Delta, China, and 
South Asia. The RPE programme also includes North Africa and West Asia. 
3 The Scoping Study is financed by the International Development Research Centre and coordinated by the World Agroforestry 
Centre. Partners in the study included the World Conservation Union (IUCN), Forest Trends, the Division for Environmental 
Conventions of the United Nations Environment Program, Corporación Grupo Randi Randi (Ecuador), the African Centre for 
Technology Studies, the Institute for Social and Economic Change (India). 
4 Summary reports on the regional workshops have been prepared by Poats (Latin America), Raju et al. (Asia) and Ochieng, 
Otiende and Rumley (Africa). 
  17social context within which ecosystem stewards, beneficiaries and intermediaries interact. 
Section 6 presents an overview of the current situation of CRES in developing countries, while 
Section 7 presents a number of conclusions.  
2. Evolution of conservation perspectives  
An early conservation approach can be termed the wilderness conservation approach, with 
roots in the 19
th century European approach to forest management. This approach invoked 
environmental conservation as a rationale for excluding common people from forests, mostly 
to the benefit of wealthy forest concessionaires. In the developing world, the wilderness 
conservation approach had greatest influence in southeast Asia where upland areas were 
declared as forest estates where human settlement should be severely limited. Seventy percent 
of Indonesia continues to be managed as state forest estate, despite the fact that some 50 
million people now live in those areas; many areas were deforested decades ago, and many 
other areas high tree cover actually managed as agroforests by local populations (Fay and 
Michon 2003).  
The protected area approach became the backbone of the western conservation movement in 
the 20
th century. From a conservation perspective, this approach symbolically proposed the 
building of a new Ark, isolating and protecting designated areas and species from surrounding 
areas of human impact. The fundamental understanding underlying this approach was that 
growth of human populations and economic activity is invariably destructive to the 
environment, and therefore there is a need to protect areas of acute stress through managerial 
or legal means. The wilderness conservation perspective may have motivated most of the best 
known of the early environmental organizations such as the IUCN, WWF and the Sierra Club. 
In the United States, this led to the establishment of the National Parks system, which 
continues to inspire the parks approach to conservation across the world. The wilderness 
conservation perspective also underpinned the Biosphere Reserve approach of UNESCO’s 
Man and Biosphere programme. Biosphere reserves usually consists of three concentric rings, 
which include an inner ring or core conservation area, a middle ring most often referred to as 
the buffer zone, and a third ring or transition zone where various degrees of human activity 
occur (Martino 2001). Park creation involved the removal of people from parks and their 
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was largely restricted to local community members, managed by a system of ‘fences and 
fines’, and preserved mostly for consumption by tourists. Communities have rarely been 
compensated adequately for the loss of their land. As a result, poor rural populations have been 
put at further risk by reduction of production capacity, decreased income, and uncertain land 
tenure (Neumann 1996; Peluso 1993). To date, the Man and Biosphere program is host to 368 
biosphere reserves in 91 countries, and the list continues to grow. The parks approach 
continues to be the main approach to conservation across the world, with 11.5% of the earth’s 
land area now designated as some type of conservation reserve (Chape et al. 2003). While the 
wildness conservation perspective has been scrupulously followed in many parts of the 
developing world, it often has been criticized as quintessentially Northern in orientation, 
inconsistent and insensitive to the values and practices of people in other parts of the world 
where it has been applied (Holdgate 1999). There are many people in the conservation 
community who still ardently defend the protected area approach.  
In light of rising concerns about chemical pollution, hazardous waste and human dependence 
on non-renewable resources, the Club of Rome Report of the 1970s continued to espouse the 
perspective that economic development is harmful to the environment. Rather than advocating 
the protection of isolated regions or species, the Club of Rome Report called for a fundamental 
change in behavior and values, and especially a slowdown or reversal in the rate of economic 
and demographic change. Nonetheless, the orthodox approach of establishing protected areas 
to concentrate attention on areas of acute stress and to try to protect them through managerial 
or legal means still prevailed. Many conservation organizations and professionals continue to 
stress the importance of the parks approach. 
It was not until the formation of the concept of Sustainable Development – introduced by 
IUCN, WWF and UNEP in the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN et al. 1980) – that the 
approach to conservation began to slowly but fundamentally change. The underlying idea 
espoused was that it was possible to harmonize the objectives of economic development and 
conservation through the choice of appropriate policies and market-based instruments. More 
specifically, it was recognized that the natural resource base was inextricably linked to the 
prospects of economic development, and that it was possible to achieve economic 
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resource degradation.  
With the advent of the Brundlandt Commission report in 1987 (WCED 1987), conservation 
approaches faced another apparent dilemma. For the first time at the global level, an 
inextricable link between poverty and environment was revealed and highlighted. The 
Brundlandt report states that: 
“Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems”  
“Many parts of the world are caught in a vicious downwards spiral: poor people are forced 
to overuse environmental resources to survive from day to day, and their impoverishment of 
their environment further impoverishes them, making their survival more difficult and 
uncertain” (WCED 1987; p. 3). 
The Brundlandt report, while bringing to the forefront an important perceived relationship, 
nevertheless painted a pessimistic picture of poverty - environment interactions, reflecting the 
image of a vicious downward spiral of need. The orthodox conservation approach latched onto 
this relationship and accordingly advocated that demographic and economic changes were 
contributing to this process. The basic idea was that rapid change occurring in ecologically 
vulnerable urban or rural areas ‘poverty reserves’ had the greatest environmental implications. 
The solutions offered were directed at macroeconomic poverty eradication measures and the 
continuation of short-term land management or protection schemes excluding certain land uses 
while seeking to protect fragile ecosystems from encroachment by poor people.  
Such top-down and exclusionary approaches to poverty reduction and environmental 
protection ultimately met severe criticism both for failing to meet local livelihood needs and 
failing to protect natural resources. The approach did not take proper account of the political 
economy of power and use of resources whereby the rich and powerful were able to use 
natural resources for unsustainable activities at very low rents thereby leading ecosystem 
declines which in turn pushed many social groups dependent on the ecosystems into poverty 
(Duraiappah 1998). The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 began a movement toward more localized, 
community-based approaches to natural resource management and sustainable development, a 
movement that was at least partially slowed by Indira Ghandi’s infamous statement that 
poverty is the main driver of environmental degradation.  
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distinctively Southern conservation approach of what Guha (1989) calls the poor peoples’ 
conservation movements. As exemplified by the famous Chipko movement in India, this 
approach sees the environment-poverty relationship running in the opposite direction, with 
environmental degradation seen as inimical to the prospects of socio-economic progress and 
poverty reduction. At the heart of this approach has been a political conception of 
environmental degradation, stemming from the unequal distribution of political and 
communicative power. As a result, the solution that is advocated is primarily in terms of 
empowerment and collective action.  
As a result of the sustainable development ethos, the approach to conservation sees the 
simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, poverty reduction and environmental 
conservation to be not only possible but also necessary. Under this approach, two major 
strands are visible. One strand lays major emphasis on community-based approaches, which 
seek to create and strengthen institutions that can make the pursuit of economic prosperity, 
poverty reduction and conservation possible. The approach builds on some innovative work on 
poverty reduction that concentrates attention on the building of social capital among 
stakeholders (Putnam 2000). Behind this approach is an alternative conception of poverty that 
places central emphasis on uncertainty, vulnerability and shocks as well as the ability of poor 
people to adapt and cope to changes (Narayan et al. 2000). The second strand, as highlighted 
in article 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) calls upon the CBD parties to 
“... as far as possible and as appropriate, adopt economically and socially sound measures 
that act as incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of components of biological 
diversity” (http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.shtml?a=cbd-11)  
Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) emerged as an alternative to the 
fines and fences approach in the late 1970s. The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and 
World Bank supported ICDPs around the developing world. ICDPs were designed to 
simultaneously advance three goals of sustainable development: (i) more effective biodiversity 
conservation; (ii) increased community participation in conservation and development; and 
(iii) economic opportunities for the rural poor (Wells et al. 1999). However it is generally 
acknowledged that the results of increased conservation and economic development have been 
mixed (WWF 2000, 2001; Oates 1999). Some examples of successful community-based 
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the schemes have often been difficult to sustain in financial terms and their conservation 
impact have rarely matched expectations because of the inability to decrease demand for 
ecosystem services.  
The emerging lessons and motivations towards direct approaches to conservation point to the 
fact that ecosystem conservation requires a steady stream of financial resources that is 
adequate not just to cover the direct costs of ecosystem management, but also to offset the 
opportunity costs that conservation incurs at the local level. The opportunity costs incurred at 
the local level shape the economic incentives for the conservation effort. Unlike traditional 
conservation approaches, payment for environmental services therefore revolves around direct 
payment for services provided and received, rather than on a system of indirect benefits or 
‘conservation subsidies’ which are injected from outside, and which have often proved 
unreliable or unsustainable over the long term (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). 
3. The origins and development of market-based 
instruments for environmental policy  
The theory behind market-based approaches to environmental policy was first developed in the 
1960s by Dales (1968) and Crocker (1966). These economists proposed cap-and-trade systems 
to manage pollution in which limited amounts of rights to pollute or use natural resources 
would be distributed to stakeholders, then could be bought and sold. Firms with lower 
pollution abatement costs would be able to sell emission permits to firms with higher 
abatement costs. Compared to the blanket application of fixed standards, these flexible 
mechanisms would meet the same emission standards at lower total cost to the economy 
(Woodward 2005).  
The US Environmental Protection Agency began to experiment with emission credits in 1974, 
allowing firms to earn credits by surpassing emission targets for CO, SO2 and NOx in one part 
of their firm that could be applied to higher emissions in other parts of the same firm. The 
emission offset program began in 1977, for the first time allowing firms to trade emission 
credits with other firms and to bank credits for future use. These instruments were codified in 
the Emission Trading Programme in 1986. Greater impetus for the use of market-based 
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environmental policy initiative, Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces to Protect our 
Environment. A number of other emission trading regimes were initiated in the United States 
in the 1980s and 1990s. By 2001, the United States Environmental Protection Agency was 
actively involved in the design or implementation of 35 emission trading projects across the 
United States. The largest and perhaps most successful emission trading regimes in the United 
States were the lead trading regime that gave gasoline manufacturers greatly flexibility in 
meeting lead content regulations, and the SO2 allowance trading regime for acid rain control 
(Stavins 2000, 2002). It has been estimated that the SO2 trading regime has resulted in average 
cost savings of US$1 billion per year, compared to the command-and-control approaches that 
were considered by the US Congress (Stavins 2005). In 2004 there were about 70 water 
quality trading initiatives in the United States (King 2005).  
US schemes for Wetlands Mitigation Banking are an example of what is called ‘biodiversity 
offsets’. Concerns over continued loss of wetlands led to the articulation of a national goal of 
no net loss of wetlands and the environmental services that they provide. The US Army Corps 
of Engineers requires that project developers who fill in wetlands mitigate their impacts as 
much as possible. If full mitigation is not possible, then the developers are able to offset 
damage to one wetland with the conservation or rehabilitation of another wetland. Single-user 
wetland mitigation allows project developers to bank up credits from wetland restoration in 
one area that can later be drawn upon to offset damage in other areas. Commercial wetland 
mitigation banks allow the development of a market in wetland restoration, with 
environmental consulting firms restoring wetlands and selling the wetland offsets to project 
developers as the need arises. Despite its obvious theoretical advantages, only about 10-20% 
of all wetland banking schemes take the form of commercial banks (Shabman and Scodari 
2005). Operating in a broader variety of ecosystems and countries, the Business and 
Biodiversity Offset Programme (BBOP) encourages businesses that cause unavoidable damage 
to biodiversity to voluntarily offset those impacts by making corresponding investments in 
biodiversity conservation (www.forest-trends.org/biodiversityoffsetprogram/). 
Until the late 1980s, environmental policy in Europe followed the standard command-and-
control approach, with little harmonization between countries. The year 1992 marked a 
watershed in environmental policy in Europe, after which there has been considerable 
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describe four types of New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) that have emerged over 
the last 15 years: (1) Market-based instruments, including eco-taxes, tradeable permit systems, 
subsidies and deposit-refund schemes; (2) eco-labels – including those that are externally-
verified, unverified self-declaratory schemes, and single-issue schemes; (3) voluntary 
environmental management and business certification systems; and (4) voluntary agreements 
between industry and public authorities on the achievement of environmental objectives, 
including negotiated agreements, public voluntary schemes, and unilateral commitments.  
A study of environmental policy in 7 European countries, the European Union as a whole, plus 
Australia, shows large variation in approach from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Eco-taxes are 
most common in Finland and the Netherlands, tradable permits common only in the UK, 
voluntary agreements most common in Germany and the Netherlands, eco-labels most 
common in Germany and Finland, and environmental management systems common in 
Finland, Germany and Austria. Countries such as Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Austria have been much more innovative in adopting New Environmental Policy Instruments 
than countries such as Ireland, France and Australia (Jordan et al. 2003, Table 1).  
Table 1. The distribution of new policy instruments in 9 jurisdictions of Europe and Australia 
  Eco-taxes Permits  Agreements Eco-labels  Systems 
Finland  High  Low  Medium  High  High 
Germany  Medium  Low  High  High  High 
Netherlands  High  High  High  Low  Medium 
Austria  Medium  Low  Medium  Medium  High 
UK  Medium  High  Low/Medium  Low  Low/Medium 
Ireland  Low Low  Low/Medium  Low Medium 
European Union  Low  Low/Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium 
France Medium  Low  Low Low  Low 
Australia  Low Low  Low  Low Medium 
Source: Jordan et. al. 2003. 
 
Environmental policy in the developing world still relies primarily on command-and-control 
policy instruments, some of which are a legacy of colonial governance systems. For example, 
forestry policy in many parts of Africa and Asia is a hold-over of European forest laws that 
justified the exclusion of peasant farmers from large tracts of land on the basis of arguments 
about the environmental services of forest ecosystems. Harsh enforcement of soil and water 
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The post-colonial period was a time of resistance against the colonial laws, with significant 
conflict in countries such as Indonesia and weak enforcement in countries like Kenya. The Rio 
Summit of 1992 brought about a new phase of environmental regulation in many developing 
countries, with under-resourced Environmental Management Authorities still largely relying 
on command-and-control policies, despite the remaining challenges of enforcing such policies. 
The Rio environmental conventions on biodiversity, climate change and desertification 
mandated the parties to develop national-level laws and strategies consistent with the 
objectives of the conventions, with only one of those conventions, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), providing the possibility for market-based policy 
instruments.  
Di Leva (2002) describes 3 categories of market-based instruments that have made significant 
inroads in developing countries: (1) traditional revenue-raising measures adjusted to 
environmental concerns; (2) real property measures adjusted to conservation needs, such as 
conservation easements; and (3) protection through a variety of more recent legal instruments, 
such as carbon sequestration under the Kyoto Protocol and transferable quotas. Ecotourism is 
the main example of the first category of instruments, with up to 20 percent of tourism to the 
Asia / Pacific region being linked to nature holidays. Ecotourism can provide conservation 
incentives to rural communities in two ways, through the sharing of revenue generated from 
user fees with communities surrounding protected areas that attract tourists, and through 
community-owned or community-managed ecotourism facilities. The regional workshops for 
Latin America and Africa revealed that many countries in Latin America and Africa have 
accumulated significant experience with such mechanisms. In East and Southern Africa, there 
are a growing number of communities involved in ecotourism, contributing to the conservation 
of significant tracts of savannah grassland. The Community Conservancies of Namibia are 
perhaps the most obvious success story. Fees for bio-prospecting attracted a great deal of 
attention during the formulation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. While there are a 
few high profile bio-prospecting arrangements involving the payment of significant amounts 
of money by private firms, the overall amounts involved across the developing world remain 
miniscule. 
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few cases of self-organized deals in which the beneficiaries of environmental services pay 
ecosystem stewards to maintain the quality of environmental services. Since 1997, the City of 
New York has invested US$1.5 billion in conservation of the Catskills / Delaware catchment, 
which is the major source of water for the city. In exchange farmers, businesses and local 
governments in the catchment area have agreed to undertake a range of conservation activities 
and foregone development opportunities. Similar mechanisms are now in place in several 
locations in Latin America and Asia, and there is considerable interest in East and Southern 
Africa in instituting similar arrangements (see regional workshop reports for Latin America - 
ICRAF Working Paper no. 33, Africa - ICRAF Working Paper no. 35 and Asia - ICRAF 
Working Paper no. 34). 
Utting (2005) notes that these various changes in the environmental policy environment over 
the last 20 years are part of an overall trend toward ‘re-regulation’, where rolling back the role 
of the state and liberalization of markets have been accompanied by the strengthening of 
governmental and intergovernmental rules to protect, for example, certain types of property 
rights, international trade and investment, and the environment. Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) has been increasingly important since the late 1990s, with companies 
increasingly being held accountable by non-governmental organizations and public-private 
partnerships, practicing so-called civil regulation or co-regulation. These ‘collective’ or more 
‘socialized’ forms of private authority (O’Rourke 2003) are increasingly supported by 
governments and intergovernmental organizations. While most of this change in the corporate 
regulatory environment is occurring in Europe and North America, there are both positive and 
negative spillover effects to developing countries. For example, concern about the carbon 
emissions associated with air transport of flowers from Africa to Europe could jeopardize one 
of the few sources of foreign exchange and vibrant economic growth in Kenya (Daily Nation, 
Feb 18, 2007). 
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for environmental services  
4.1 Definitions and concepts 
A variety of terms are used in the academic and empirical literature to describe new market 
instruments for environmental policy. Some analysts see the terms as describing distinct 
concepts, while other analysts use terms relatively inter-changeably. Motivated by the review 
presented in Section 3, this section seeks to clarify some of these key terms, structured around 
a simple conceptual framework.  
Two important terms are environmental services and ecosystem services. Environmental 
services is a term widely commonly used in the engineering profession to refer to the 
professional services that engineers provide to mitigate environmental damage. The 
Environmental Services Association, for example, “represents the UK’s waste management 
and secondary resources industry”, http://www.esauk.org/, while Golder Associates is a large 
international consulting firm specializing in “ground engineering and environmental services”. 
http://www.golder.com/ default.asp?PID =1&LID=1. However, in this paper we ascribe to the 
environmental economist’s concept of environmental service as a positive benefit that people 
obtain from the environment. That is, an environmental service is generated when an economic 
activity in one place, controlled by one economic agent, has positive spillover effects on other 
consumers or producers, often in other places. The environmental services of good forest 
management, for example, are usually categorized into watershed protection, biodiversity 
conservation, atmospheric regulation (including greenhouse gas mitigation), and landscape 
beauty (e.g. Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-Mills, 2002). Analysts such as Scherr and McNeely 
(2003) and Daily, Ehrlich and Sánchez-Azofeifa (2001) have noted that human-dominated 
landscapes can also generate important levels of environmental services. The ASB Partnership 
for the Humid Forest Margins has shown that human-dominated landscapes in the humid 
tropics are associated with a wide range of environmental services, with multi-strata 
agroforestry systems generating much higher levels of environmental services than secondary 
forests or forest plantations, although clearly lower than primary forests (Tomich, Thomas and 
Van Noordwijk 2004).  
  27The concept of ecosystem services has been in common use for some decades, developed and 
applied jointly by economists and ecologists. The concept remains somewhat elusive and, in 
some circles, controversial. In the year 2000, the Ecological Society of America produced a 
primer on ecosystem services that defined ecosystem services as “the processes by which the 
environment produces resources that we often take for granted such as clean water, timber, and 
habitat for fisheries, and pollination of native and agricultural plants” 
(http://www.actionbioscience.org/environment/ esa.html). This is the definition which is used 
by Wikipedia. It contrasts considerably with the definition used by the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA) which defines an ecosystem as a dynamic complex of plant, animal and 
microorganism communities and the nonliving environment acting as a functional unit and 
ecosystem services as “… the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include 
provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services such as regulation of floods, 
drought, land degradation, and disease; supporting services such as soil formation and 
nutrient cycling; and cultural services such as recreational, spiritual, religious and other 
nonmaterial benefit” (MA, Chapter 1, Conceptual Framework, p.27). The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment definition focuses on outputs, rather than processes, and it considers a 
much broader range of outputs, especially provisioning outputs, than does the Ecological 
Society of America definition. In this paper, we ascribe to the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment definition of ecosystem services, although we note that market-based instruments 
are generally much more effective for provisioning services than for regulating, supporting or 
cultural services. It is worth noting that the concept of ecosystem services is still controversial 
in discussions of environmental policy, with the concept basically rejected during recent 
discussions of the Conference of Parties to the Ramsar Convention and the delegates to the 
United Nations Forum on Forests. Table 2 presents a categorization of provisioning, regulating 
and cultural services, as well as the types of values that they represent. Supporting services 
underpin the other types of services. 
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reflect goods and 
services produced in 
the ecosystem 
Regulating services result from the 
capacity of ecosystems to regulate 
climate, hydrological and bio-
chemical cycles, earth surface 
processes, and a variety of biological 
processes 
Cultural services relate to the 
benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems through recreation, 
cognitive development, 





Food, fodder, fuel 
(wood and dung), 






Carbon sequestration; climate 
regulation through regulation of 
albedo, temperature and rainfall 
patterns; regulation of the timing and 
volume of river and ground water 
flows; protection against floods by 
coastal or riparian systems; 
regulation of erosion and 
sedimentation; regulation of species 
reproduction (nursery function); 
breakdown of excess nutrients and 
pollution; pollination; regulation of 
pests and pathogens; protection 
against storms; protection against 
noise and dust; and biological 
nitrogen fixation  
Nature and biodiversity (provision 
of a habitat for wild plant and 
animal species); provision of 
cultural, historical and religious 
heritage (e.g. a historical 
landscape or a sacred forests); 
provision of scientific and 
educational information; 
provision of opportunities for 
recreation and tourism; provision 
of attractive landscape features 
enhancing housing and living 
conditions (amenity service); 
provision of other information 




Direct use value 
Option values 
Indirect use values 
Option values 
Direct use value 
Non-use values 
Source: Hein et al. 2006 (based on Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Costanza et al. 1997; De Groot et al. 2002; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2003.) 
 
In practice, the main difference between ecosystem services and environmental services is the 
inclusion or exclusion of provisioning ecosystem services. Almost all provisioning ecosystem 
services – food, fiber, timber – are excludable and rivalrous, goods for which markets develop 
most readily. The focus in this paper is on non-provisioning services – especially regulatory 
and cultural services – for which markets do not easily develop because of high exclusion 
costs, non-rivalrous consumption, or significant externality effects. 
In a 2005 publication, Sven Wunder noted that there was no agreed definition of ‘payment for 
environmental service (PES)’, despite its common use in the literature. He proposed the 
following definition, “a voluntary, conditional transaction where at least one buyer pays at 
least one seller for maintaining or adopting sustainable land management practices that 
favour the provision of a well-defined environmental service”  (Wunder 2005). While this 
definition has been generally accepted by the international experts working on market-based 
instruments for environmental policy, it also is controversial. Wunder himself has shown that 
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adopting PES-like as a more inclusive and flexible term in more recent publications.  
In this project we do not challenge the Wunder definition of PES per se, but do doubt its 
usefulness for describing and analyzing the range of interesting and important mechanisms 
that are being negotiated for managing interactions between people with diverse interests in 
ecosystem management and ecosystem services. In particular, we note that the relationships 
between ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries and intermediaries may be 
more complex than a simple transaction, with agreements that are not wholly voluntary and 
payments that are not wholly conditional. Rather than offering an alternative definition of 
payments for environmental services, we develop a conceptual framework that illustrates 
different types of relationships between stewards, beneficiaries and intermediaries.5 We 
suggest that the term compensation and rewards for environmental services (CRES) captures 
most relationships. Later in this section, we offer definitions for these terms. 
4.2 Identification and characterization of actors in compensation 
and rewards for environmental services  
We can identify three generic types of stakeholders or functional groups in compensation and 
rewards for environmental services: ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries, 
and intermediaries. While we tend to refer to these as distinct groups of people or agents 
operating within and dependent on an ecosystem, it is important to keep in mind that there may 
be ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries and intermediaries within the same 
village or family. Indeed, individual persons, communities or corporations may simultaneously 
be ecosystem service stewards/modifiers, beneficiaries and intermediaries.  
An  ecosystem steward is an entity (individual, family, group, community) whose actions 
modify the quantity or quality of ecosystem services available to environmental service 
beneficiaries. We call them stewards in this framework to recognize that such entities are 
recognized by society as having the right to interact closely with an ecosystem, provided that 
they accept certain limitations on those rights and certain obligations to maintain the 
 
5 This framework builds upon the framework presented in Tomich et al. 2004. 
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stewards and their relationships with the ecosystem and other actors: 
a. Exclusion or inclusion criteria. What criteria are implicitly or explicitly used to define who 
is in and out of the different groups of ecosystem stewards (ethnicity, gender, ability to 
pay, residential location, political power)?  
b. Type and strength of groups and other forms of social organization, including their social 
and political capital;  
c. Nature of the cause-effect relationship between ecosystem stewards and the ecosystem. 
What technologies, land use practices or enterprises are associated with benign or 
destructive use of the ecosystem? What geographic locations within the ecosystem are 
particularly important for ecosystem structure and function and what are the threats and 
pressures on those locations? What technologies, land use practices or enterprises might be 
promoted or actively discouraged with the ecosystem stewards to better conserve or 
enhance the ecosystem? How fast or slow are the relationships – do they act over minutes, 
days or decades? Are the relationships relatively linear, non-linear or subject to 
thresholds? 
d. Location vis-à-vis the ecosystem – e.g. upstream, midstream or downstream within a 
watershed; adjacent to or relatively distant from a protected area or wetland; located within 
or outside of an ecosystem;  
e. Their rights and discretion over the way the ecosystem is used and managed and over the 
design of mechanisms that shape overall management and use of the ecosystem;  
f. Their level of human well-being, poverty and deprivation – both in absolute terms and 
relative to other actors affecting the ecosystem; 
g.  Their demographic composition – in terms of gender, ethnicity, age and livelihood 
strategies;  
 
Environmental service beneficiaries are entities (individuals, families, groups, corporations, 
towns, utility companies) who benefit from the environmental services generated by an 
ecosystem. Environmental service beneficiaries can be characterized by:  
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a. Types of environmental and other ecosystem services they benefit from – see Table 2 for 
the full list of ecosystem services;  
b. Location – physical location within or outside of the ecosystem, within or outside of the 
administrative area or country where the ecosystem is located;  
c.  Degree and type of dependence on the environmental service – for subsistence or 
commercial exploitation; 
d. Access to alternative supplies of the environmental services or good substitutes for those 
services – for example environmental service beneficiaries who rely only on the regulating 
service of Certified (carbon) Emission Reductions are likely to be able to draw upon a 
much wider range of alternative suppliers than those who rely on the environmental 
service of flood mitigation;  
e. Level and trend in different dimensions of human well-being / deprivation;  
f. Strength and type of property rights or entitlements to the environmental service;  
g. Discretion over the way the ecosystem is used and managed; 
h. Demographic composition – gender, ethnicity, age and occupation;  
i. Type and strength of groups and other forms of social organization; 
j. Their action resources 6 viz. the environmental services and their relations with others. 
  
Intermediaries are entities (public authorities, non-governmental organizations, community- or 
faith-based organizations, projects) that directly or indirectly shape interactions among 
ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries, and the ecosystem itself. Ecosystem 
service intermediaries perform a variety of roles in compensation and rewards for 
environmental services, including providing information relevant to design, monitoring and 
evaluation of contracts and negotiated agreements, providing a forum for negotiations, 
enforcing the terms of regulations and contracts, and offsetting the transaction costs of 
establishing and maintaining a working mechanism. Intermediaries can be characterized by: 
 
6 Action resources include intangible and tangible assets that give actors the capability for agency – the ability to 
exercise choices, to participate in collective action at various levels, or to influence other actors' choices. All forms of 
assets – natural, physical, financial, human, and social capital – can be action resources (Ostrom 2007; Swallow et al. 
2007).  
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mechanisms vary greatly in terms of mandate and objectives, from international 
conservation organizations, international and national research organizations, local 
governments, philanthropists, international development assistance organizations, state 
and local arms of government.  
b. Representation – Some intermediaries act on behalf of ecosystem stewards, environmental 
service beneficiaries, or third parties with interest in the ecosystem or people living in the 
ecosystem; 
c. Source of authority – international convention, national law or policy, customary laws, 
local practice, control over financial or physical resources, ownership or direct financial 
interest in resource use, influence over the behavior of other authorities; 
d. Type of influence on the behavior of ecosystem stewards and environmental service 
beneficiaries – imposition and / or enforcement of regulations on resource use; 
subsidization of the costs of establishing or maintaining an environmental management 
regime; subsidization or provision of positive incentives.  
4.3 Definition and typology of compensation and rewards for 
environmental services  
Experts working on the area of payments and rewards for ecosystem services generally 
characterize the contracts and agreements by two criteria: a) the type of ecosystem or 
environmental service – usually landscape beauty, biodiversity conservation, watershed 
protection and carbon sequestration; and b) type of contractual arrangement – usually a) self-
organized deals, b) open-trading schemes under cap-and-trade systems, c) payments made to 
ecosystem stewards by public agencies or philanthropic organizations, and d) ecolabelling or 
certification of products generated in ways that are consistent with good ecosystem 
stewardship (see e.g. Jenkins 2006). In this section of the paper we recognize the salience of 
this typification, but strengthen the focus on the different stakeholder groups and the type of 
behavior that the compensation or rewards attempts to modify or offset. Reference to the four 
types of contractual arrangement, and others, are made.  
We define the term, Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) as 
follows: contractual arrangements and negotiated agreements among ecosystem stewards, 
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maintaining, re-allocating or offsetting damage to environmental services.  
A particular CRES contract or negotiated agreement will include a compensation or reward 
instrument or combination of instruments. We thus need to define the terms compensation for 
environmental services (CES) and rewards of environmental services (RES): 
Compensation for environmental services (CES) are payments or other forms of restitution 
made to economic service beneficiaries or ecosystem stewards to offset foregone entitlements 
to environmental services or ecosystem stewardship benefits.  
Rewards of Environmental Services (RES) are inducements provided to ecosystem stewards to 
enhance or continue to maintain environmental services.  
Further distinction among CRES mechanisms is useful to clarify the agents involved, the 
action that is being rewarded, and the nature of the contractual arrangement or negotiated 
agreement. We distinguish two types of compensation (CES1 and CES2) and two types of 
reward mechanisms (RES1 and RES2), as depicted graphically in Figure 1. 
CES1 – Compensation to environmental service beneficiaries for socially-disappointing 
damage to environmental services by ecosystem stewards. CES1 includes self-organized deals 
between stewards and beneficiaries, restitution payments that are mandated or ordered by 
intermediary organizations, as well as compensation payments made by an intermediary 
organization. CES1 aligns with the principle of ‘polluter pay’.  
CES2 – Self-organized contracts, negotiated agreements or tradable allowance and permit 
systems that facilitate exchange of environmental service entitlements among environmental 
service beneficiaries. This includes cap-and-trade systems for emissions and conservation 
concessions.  
RES1 – Rewards to ecosystem stewards for foregone stewardship rights or threat reduction. 
RES1 includes self-organized deals between ecosystem stewards and environmental service 
beneficiaries, public programmes of reward made on behalf of beneficiaries and eco-labeling 
and certification schemes for products generated through good stewardship practices. 
Examples include farmers being rewarded for not scaring migratory birds away from their 
crops. It would also include rewards to farmers who adopt zero-grazing for their cattle as a 
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construction of a water point for a village to reduce use of a water point located inside of a 
biodiversity conservation area.  
RES2 – Rewards to ecosystem stewards for undertaking extra investments or management 
practices that restore or enhance the ecosystem. This includes self-organized deals and public 
programmes of reward. This would include, for example, support to the planting of indigenous 
trees that provide greater habitat value for threatened birds. 
Van Noordwijk et al. (this series) identify and discuss four key attributes of CRES 
mechanisms – realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor.  
4.4 Graphical depiction of the basic conceptual framework  
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the concepts presented in this section of the paper. 
The upper left bubbles represent the ecosystem – with ecosystem structure and function 
transformed by an ecological production function into ecosystem services. Environmental 
service beneficiaries benefit from environmental services, either directly or through some 
value or market chain. They may or may not interact with two other stakeholder groups: 
ecosystem stewards and intermediaries. Ecosystem stewards interact directly with the 
ecosystem, with three types of effects on the ecosystem: use or extraction of ecosystem 
resources; conservation and protection of the ecosystem; and investment and management to 
enhance the ecosystem. The solid lines joining the boxes show direct relationships. The four 
types of compensation and rewards for ecosystem services are indicated, with dashed lines 
showing transfers of resources. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of key concepts and types of compensation and rewards for environmental 
services. 
 
4.5 Characterization of mechanisms for compensation and rewards 
for environmental services 
Experience shows that mechanisms of compensation and rewards for environmental services 
can be characterized in several respects in addition to the stakeholder characteristics discussed 
in Section 4.2 and the typology presented in section 4.3. These characteristics affect the 
performance of the mechanism in terms of ecosystem management and impacts on poverty and 
human well-being.  
Relationships among ecosystem stewards, environmental service beneficiaries and 
intermediaries.  What is the nature of previous and confounding relations between ecosystem 
stewards, environmental service beneficiaries, and intermediaries? Are there any lingering 
conflicts that hamper fair negotiation and enforcement? Is the mechanism the only contractual 
or negotiated relationship among the parties, or is this part of a multi-stranded social, 
economic and / or political relationship? Do the other strands hamper or hinder the likelihood 









































  36Characteristics of the mechanisms: 
a. Nature of the contract or agreement among the stakeholder groups. Are there individual or 
group contracts, enforcement agency (statutory or customary authorities?) 
b. Transaction costs of establishing and operating the mechanism, including information, 
contracting and enforcement; distribution of those transaction costs; 
c. Type of remuneration or incentives provided as compensation or rewards. Is there quid pro 
quo exchange of money for divisible, excludable goods, as normally is the case for 
provisioning goods? Are more secure property rights, public services or extension services 
explicit or implicit components of the contract or agreement? 
d. What market-based instruments are used? Market-based instruments are tangible pieces of 
evidence of environmental services that are issued or certified by some public or private 
authority and backed by the reputation or legal sanction held by that authority. Market-
based instruments for environmental services have been created to encourage private-
sector enterprises to internalize the environmental externalities of their actions. Trade in 
those market-based instruments is intended to increase the efficiency in the way that 
environmental costs are born by the overall economy. Examples of market-based 
instruments include Certified Emission Reductions (backed by the Executive Board of the 
Clean Development Mechanism and certified by reputable private firms) and wetland 
credits backed by the US Army Corps of Engineers and United States Wetland Mitigation 
Banking Program (see http.ecosystemmarketplace.com).  
e. Temporal pattern of payment. Is the payment a recurrent payment to offset the opportunity 
costs of lower returns or a lump sum which is assumed to facilitate ecosystem stewards to 
make the investments necessary to surpass some type of threshold? 
4.6 Characterization of the external environment and drivers 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between different functional groups and ecosystems 
services within an ecosystem. Figure 2 recognizes that these interactions occur within a 
broader social and environmental context. Different driving forces – social, economic and 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the external factors shaping compensation and rewards for environmental 
services. 
International political and economic environment – Multilateral environmental agreements, 
international development assistance flows, foreign direct investment, expectations of 
corporate social responsibility.  
Climate conditions – Short and long-duration climate events, including extreme rainfall events, 
El Niño events and global warming. 
National political and economic environment – Policies, strategies and regulations affecting 
the environment, water, governance and property rights. ICRAF Working Papers 38 and 39 in 
this series explores the importance of internal and external conditions in determining the 
effectiveness of CRES mechansims.  
5. Public policy context, expectations and 
compensation and rewards for environmental 
services 
An issue that was repeatedly stressed in the regional workshops and other public presentations 
of the results of this scoping study was the context of public policy and social expectations 
within which contracts and negotiated agreements are worked out. Several interesting lines of 
argument emerged.  
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has responsibility for ecosystem management in the country. Following this line of argument, 
the government is the trustee of ecosystem management on behalf of the people, if there is 
degradation of ecosystems and environmental services; it is because the government has failed 
to adequately discharge its responsibilities as trustee. Emphasis should be placed on 
strengthening the trusteeship role of government or devolving those roles to different tiers of 
government or user groups. While this argument was presented most clearly in India, it likely 
would hold sway in any context of strong state control of the economy and the natural resource 
base. However, experience from around the developing world shows that certain types of 
compensation and reward mechanisms may be perfectly well aligned with this trusteeship role, 
especially the large state systems of payment in South Africa (Working for Water), China and 
Meso-America. Self-organized deals and eco-labelling arrangements may play less of a role in 
such situations.  
In other national contexts, particularly in East Africa and the Andes, there were arguments 
about the problems of “paying people to obey the law”. That is, a number of fairly strict 
national laws and regulations are in place, but are generally disregarded by ecosystem 
stewards and poorly enforced by intermediaries. Mechanisms of reward for environmental 
services have the potential to reward people for simply doing what they should be doing 
anyway. Some of the agencies involved as intermediaries in these mechanisms stressed that 
they make sure that their mechanisms are fully consistent with the law, sometimes employing 
deliberate language to ensure that compliance. The Wildlife Consolation Programme in the 
Kitengala Plains of Kenya deliberately uses the word ‘consolation’ to describe their payments 
for loss of livestock due to predators, since the Kenya Wildlife Act does not allow for 
‘compensation’ for damage caused by wildlife. Other agencies involved as intermediaries 
indicated that they did not pay full attention to the dictates of formal law, but rather considered 
the local social norms of behaviour. If the local norm was to cultivate steep hillsides in water 
catchment areas, then farmers should be rewarded to forego that practice, even if there is an 
unenforced national law that prohibits the practice.  
At a recent workshop on bylaws for natural resource management, two alternative lines of 
argument emerged regarding social expectations and public policies affecting natural resource 
management. In countries that have embraced decentralized forms of government, such as 
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respond to local needs and are consistent with local expectations. It can be argued that such 
bylaws establish the norms of behaviour versus compensation and rewards for environmental 
services. In those countries, and most others in Africa, it was noted that many of the laws with 
influence on land use and ecosystem management are framework laws that define policy 
objectives and new organizations (e.g. Water Users’ Associations and the Water Resource 
Management Authorities in Kenya’s Water Act of 2002), but leave specific regulations to 
more decentralized processes and organizations. In that case, new mechanisms for 
compensation and reward for environmental services may provide important test cases and 
case law for defining expectations. 
Another line of argument that emerged through the regional workshops was that experience 
with new mechanisms of compensation and reward for environmental services may actually 
prompt changes in social expectations of acceptable behaviour. This adaptive learning role of 
compensation and reward for environmental services may be deliberately built into the 
mechanism design – as in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, or an inadvertent 
product of the process.  
Overall, what emerges is the need to carefully consider compensation and rewards for 
environmental services versus minimum acceptable behaviour, using compensation 
mechanisms to try to punish those who fail to comply with minimally acceptable behaviour, 
the standard set of regulations and social norms to encourage continuation of minimally 
acceptable behaviour, and rewards to encourage behaviour which is recognized as particularly 
good for ecosystem function and services. These types of behaviour are indicated in Figure 3 
using the analogy of the traffic light. Red light behaviour fails to meet minimum social 
expectations and thus should be punished in the form of fines and / or compensation payments. 
Compensation payments are designed to prompt beneficiaries to move toward amber light, 
socially-acceptable, behaviour. Amber light behaviour is consistent with social expectations. 
And green light behaviour exceeds social expectations by enough to warrant particular reward. 
Rewards should be sufficient to prompt ecosystem stewards to adopt such land uses. The trend 
lines indicated in the third column of Figure 3 indicate the possible trends in social 
expectations over time as resource conditions change and compensation and reward 
mechanisms are put in place. 
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Figure 3. Public policy and social expectations context for compensation and rewards for 
environmental services. 
 
Hatfield-Dobbs (2006) discusses the dynamic relationship between voluntary compensation 
and rewards, social expectations, and regulations. Figure 4 depicts a stylized situation in which 
community preferences for good environmental management increase over time, leaving a gap 
between what is generally desired and what is required by existing policy and regulation. This 
gap is similar to the yellow light zone depicted in Figure 3. Compensation and rewards for 
voluntary action can help to fill in this gap, with the gap narrowing over time as new 
mandatory standards come into force.  
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Figure 4. Contrasting perspectives on who should pay: phased polluter pays approach (favouring 
environmental and fiscal interests). Source: Hatfield-Dobbs 2006, adapted from Young et al. (2003). 
 
Hatfield-Dobbs proposes that this dynamic situation will only hold if there is a strong polluter 
pays principal underlying the environmental policy. If, on the other hand, there is a voluntary 
beneficiary pays principle underlying policy, which favours resource user interests, then the 
mandatory standards or duty of care may change very gradually, increasing the space for 
voluntary reward mechanisms over time. This situation is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Contrasting perspectives on who should pay: voluntary beneficiary pays approach (favouring 
environmental and resource user interests). Source: Hatfield-Dobbs, 2006. 
6. Overview of CRES mechanisms and perspectives 
In this section we attempt to sum up current experience and perspectives on CRES in 
developing countries. Table 3 presents a summary of twelve prototype reward mechanisms 
that are observed in developing countries, particularly in Asia where the RUPES project is 
implemented. The first six mechanisms are generally grouped under the heading of watershed 
services, with the relative demand for specific services varying from place to place. Prototype 
mechanisms 7 and 8 focus on biodiversity conservation, 9 and 10 focus on sequestration and 
conservation of carbon stocks, and 11 and 12 focus on overall environmental standards and 
landscape beauty. Column 1 summarizes the environmental service; column 2 presents 
information on the providers of the environmental services and the services that they can 
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services and the factors affecting their willingness to pay; and column 4 presents information 
on main issues that hamper or hinder the development or operation of those RES mechanisms. 
Table 3: Environmental service reward prototypes 
Environmental 
service 
Providers/ sellers  Users / buyers  Main issue 
1. Total water 
yield for 
hydroelectricity 
via storage lake 
Impacts on total water yield 
small; reservoir sedimentation 
issue may dominate the 
debate; option for sediment 
traps and landscape filters 
Consumer satisfaction 
depends on continued 
functioning; high project 
investment costs, little 
subsequent management 
flexibility  
Intercepting sediment flows 
rather than avoiding them is 
generally easier to 
accomplish; sediment flows 
out of well-managed upper 
catchments may still be high 







A change from soil quick flow 
(saturated forest soils) to 
overland flow will have some 
effect on buffering of river 
flows and hydroelectric 
operation time  
Consumer satisfaction 
depends on continued 
functioning; high project 
investment costs, little 
subsequent management 
flexibility  
Interventions influencing the 
speed of drainage (linked to 
paths, roads and drains) have 
the most direct effect on 





Intensive agriculture and 
horticulture will cause rapid 
pollution of surface flows and 
slow but persistent pollution of 
groundwater flows with 
nitrogen and pesticides; 
people residing around 
streams cause pollution E.coli 
and diseases 
Willingness to pay for 
drinking water depends 
on quality assurance from 
medical perspective, as 
well as taste 
Slow response of groundwater 
flows to changes in the 
pollutant status make 
‘regulation’ a more effective 




Land-use effects strongest for 
flow buffering of small-to-
medium sized events, with 
saturation dominating the 
large events 
Relevance of upland land 
use depends on location 
(‘floodplains’) and engi-
neering solutions (dykes, 
storage reservoirs) 
Risk avoidance for the rare 
category of large events 
5. Landslide 
prevention 
Mortality of deep-rooted trees 
(‘anchors’) causes temporary 
increase in landslide risk 
Relevance depends 
strongly on location in the 
flow paths 
Deep landslides are little 






Promoting tree cover and 
permanence of litter layer 
protecting the soil is a good 
precaution 
‘Holistic’ perception of 
watershed functions 
survives despite the lack 
of clear impacts on 
specifics  
Communication gap with 






Use value of buffer zones 
depend on hunting restrictions, 
presence of human-life 
threatening species 
Flagship species still 
dominate the public 
perception of value  
Push and pull factors in human 
land use; livelihoods operate at 
larger scales than most 
conservation plans acknowledge 
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Still new concept in 
agriculture/forest land use 
mosaics in the tropics; use 
value of patches in the 
‘stepping stones’ similar to the 
buffer zone case 
Relevance depends on 
dispersion properties of 
the species of main 
interest; sometimes 
higher connectivity not 
desirable; relevance in-
creases with climate 
change concerns 
Ex ante impact assessment of 





Options for profitable tree 
restocking primarily depend on 
policy reform 
Demand is for Certified 
Emission Reductions 
(CER) rather than carbon 
Additionality issues in the 
Clean Development 
Mechanism; high transaction 
cost 
10. Protecting 




(accessibility) is main 
determinant of ‘opportunity 
costs’ for non-conversion 
Demand is for Certified 
Emission Reductions 
(CER) rather than carbon 










Where the ‘ecolabel’ process 
starts from the consumer side, 
there can be a substantial gap 
in communication and trust, 
leading to high transaction 
costs 
Consumers with high 
sense of personal 
responsibility; gradually 
replaced by the 
introduction of standards 
and the raising of 
baselines of ‘acceptable’ 
behaviour 
Relevance of global standards 
in the face of variation in local 
conditions; transparency of the 
standards and compliance 








The local and international 
appreciation for landscape 
beauty depends on culture 
and time (fashion); rewards 
are for roles as guide and 
providers of accommodation, 
food, transport 7 handicrafts; 
gender aspects of provider 
roles may be prominent 
The appreciation of 
landscape beauty and 
cultural traditions does 
not reduce the need to 
provide security and 
comfort to potential 
tourists 
Global ecotourism is a highly 
volatile market where security 
and political concerns can 
interfere 
Source: Authors’ summary of experience, personal observations and review of the literature on RES mechanisms in developing 
countries 
 
From the international literature, and particularly from the discussions held at international 
conferences and workshops on CRES, it is possible to discern distinct perceptions of CRES 
mechanisms among analysts, donors and other stakeholders. The following paragraphs present 
our characterization of these different perceptions. We draw special attention to cases that 
were presented at the regional workshops.  
Wildlife conservation perspective. CRES is mostly viewed as a source of conservation finance 
that may or may not complement or replace public funding and entry fees. Compensation 
mechanisms, such as the consolation mechanism instituted around Nairobi Park in Kenya, are 
  44used to compensate farmers for damage to livestock and crops caused by wildlife. Reward 
mechanisms, such as the wildlife lease program also operating around Nairobi Park, may 
provide land owners with additional incentive to maintain wildlife corridors (see Ochieng, 
Otiende and Rumley 2007). Among the wildlife conservation community, there continues to 
be significant skepticism about the potential for CRES mechanisms, especially mechanisms 
such as the Clean Development Mechanism that may result in trading water and biodiversity 
for carbon. 
Environmental management perspective. CRES may be mostly viewed as a way to provide 
positive incentives for good environmental stewardship to go along with the standard set of 
environmental regulations. As discussed in the literature review above, the movement toward 
CRES in the developing world is part of a more general global trend toward negotiation and 
softer environmental regulation. Many of the participants in the regional workshops expressed 
interest in CRES mechanisms for resolving conflicts over resource access and benefit sharing.  
Poverty reduction perspective. CRES may be mostly viewed as a possible alternative income 
stream for poor people, that is, a new way to ‘put money in farmers’ pockets’. This emerged as 
a dominant perspective at the African regional workshop. At the Latin America and Asia 
regional workshops, on the other hand, many participants expressed concerns that CRES 
mechanisms, particularly carbon finance mechanisms, might also dispossess indigenous and 
poor people. This perspective has been strongly expressed in media reports of carbon 
sequestration projects in Uganda and in statements by indigenous people’s groups in Latin 
America (see Poats 2007). Indeed the RUPES project in SE Asia was distinctly designed to 
explore the potential for pro-poor mechanisms     
(www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/networks/rupes). 
Economic planning perspective. CRES may be mostly viewed as a flexible and efficient way 
of correcting market failures and collective action problems. The papers by Ferraro and Kiss 
(2002) and Pagiola et al. (2002, 2004) express this perspective.  
Rural empowerment and social equity perspective. CRES may be mostly viewed as a way to 
redress historical imbalances in the power, rights and responsibilities of resource-dependent 
people vis-a-vis environmental service beneficiaries who often enjoy greater influence over the 
political and economic processes. This perspective is particularly evident in the RUPES 
  45programme in SE Asia. From a peace and justice perspective, compensation for environment 
services may be viewed as a mechanism for managing conflicts over resource use or benefit 
sharing. 
Business perspectives.     There appear to be multiple business perspectives on CRES:   a) 
redressing environmental damage caused by business operations as a legal or ethical 
imperative; b) a component of a corporate social responsibility strategy designed to maintain 
or enhance the reputation of the business; c) complying with current or likely future 
environmental regulations; or d) sustaining or improving crucial environmental services that 
are inputs into business operations. Recent publications by Waage et al. (2007), Roberts and 
Waage (2007) and Earthwatch Institute et al. (2006) summarize information on these multiple 
motivations of business. Compliance with current environmental regulations – particularly in 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme – is the major factor driving the interests of 
European business interests in the carbon trade.  Compliance with likely future environmental 
regulations is driving U.S. business interests in the Voluntary Carbon Market. 
Farmers and ecosystem stewards. The people who live within key ecosystems may also see 
CRES from several perspectives: a) official recognition of their rights to reside in, use and 
modify a protected ecosystem; b) a new government program that provides public services in 
exchange for formation of groups and / or planting trees; c) a new source of revenue for 
performing a defined service; or d) a new way for governments and powerful interest groups to 
dispossess people from their land. ICRAF and Lampung University have recently conducted a 
conjoint analysis study of farmers’ preferences over the elements of conditional social forestry 
contracts in Sumatra and found that farmers place highest weight on recognition of their rights 
and some of the public services that they relate with the social forestry contracts.  
Environmental service beneficiaries seeking redress for environmental damage caused by 
others may see compensation for environmental services as one of several ways to redress past 
grievances. Voluntary compensation payments, negotiated outside of the legal system, may 
prove to be more effective than legally enforced payments.  
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Previous sections of this paper have reviewed the concepts and provided an overview of recent 
historical development of conservation and environmental policy across the globe. 
Conservation organizations have become increasingly interested in the possibility of using 
compensation and rewards for environmental services (CRES) as a way to make more efficient 
use of available funds and for sustaining conservation outcomes over the long term. At the 
same time, the policy, regulatory and business environments within developing countries are 
generally becoming more conducive to CRES mechanisms. Adding to this situation, there is 
increasing interest in CRES mechanisms by a variety of other agencies, including United 
Nations organizations, development donors, and non-governmental organizations. Explicitly or 
implicitly, these various organizations have different perspectives on CRES: wildlife 
conservation, environmental management, poverty reduction, economic planning, rural 
empowerment, business, ecosystem steward, or ecosystem beneficiary seeking redress. 
The situation unfolding in the developing world should be seen as part of a global trend toward 
more flexible, market-oriented and consensus-based environmental policy. As governments 
are becoming less involved in the strict enforcement of hard environmental regulations, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and civil society organizations are 
becoming more involved in exerting pressure on companies to adopt good business practices 
toward the environment. Among the countries of Europe and North America, the portfolio of 
environmental policy instruments varies considerably from country to country, and industry to 
industry, with regulations still forming the backbone of environmental management in all 
countries. We should similarly expect that systems of compensation and reward for 
environmental services will vary from country-to-country and case-to-case across the 
developing world. 
The overall experience with soft and market-based environmental policy instruments suggests 
that interest in compensation and reward for environmental policy will emerge for different 
reasons in different contexts:  
a. In a pro-growth policy environment, market-based schemes may be used to reduce the 
economic impact of tightening environmental regulation by allowing companies and 
industries flexibility in the way they adjust to environmental regulations. This is the 
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motivation for the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. While many 
developing countries are engaging in the Clean Development Mechanism, there is little 
evidence of market-based schemes emerging spontaneously in developing countries.  
b. In an environment where governments lack the political will or credibility to enforce new 
environmental regulations on powerful rural interests, they may use public compensation 
and rewards for environmental services as an extra enticement for adhering to legal or 
social expectations of behavior. This appears to be in the case in some of the Latin 
American countries that have been the biggest adopters of these mechanisms (e.g. Costa 
Rica, Mexico, see Poats, 2007).  
c. In an environment where there are public funds available for rural poverty reduction and 
environmental management, public compensation and reward mechanisms may be seen as 
a convenient way to advance both objectives.  This appears to be the case in the ‘Pagos por 
Servicios Ambientales Hidrologicos’ project in Mexico (see Poats 2007) and the Working 
for Water Programme in South Africa (see Ochieng, Otiende and Rumley 2007). This type 
of environment may hold greatest prospect for joining up environmental management and 
poverty reduction. 
d. In an environment where there has been liberalization and restructuring of public services 
for water supply and electricity generation, there may be major new openings for business 
managers to meet their business objectives in new ways. The interests of the Nairobi City 
Water and Sewerage Company or the Quito Water Company in payments for watershed 
service mechanisms may be largely due to changes in water management institutions in 
the two countries.  
e. In a situation where new environmental problems are coming to the notice of regulatory 
agencies and the general public, private businesses may see compensation and reward 
mechanisms as way to forestall or anticipate new environmental regulations. This appears 
to be the situation of the companies that have been willing to invest in voluntary carbon 
markets (Bayon, Hawn and Hamilton 2006).  
f. In a situation of growing consumer wealth and global awareness, there will be an increase 
in the number of consumers willing to pay price premiums for products that are produced 
in an environmentally-sustainable manner. Eco-labelling programmes can therefore offer 
environmentally-aware consumers with new ways to express differentiated demands / 
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trade). Experience with eco-labelling schemes to date, however, indicates that there is a 
potential for these schemes to be biased against smallscale farmers in developing countries 
(Gallastegui 2002).  
g.  In a situation of historical conflict over the use of natural resources, governments, 
communities and other interested parties may see CRES mechanisms as new ways to 
resolve conflicts without ‘giving in’. This may explain, for example, the interest in 
conditional social forestry contracts in Indonesia. 
h. Other papers in this series will address some of these issues in more detail. The paper by 
Iftikhar et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no.36) considers the links between CRES and 
human well-being in more detail, drawing upon recent understanding of the multi-
dimensional nature of human well-being and the links to ecosystem services. The paper by 
Van Noordwijk et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no.37) presents a discussion of the criteria 
that should be used to assess CRES mechanisms in developing countries – realistic, 
conditional, voluntary and pro-poor – as well as some indicators of those criteria. Swallow 
et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no.38) pick up many issues from this introductory paper in 
an analysis of the conditions in which CRES mechanisms are most likely to be effective. 
Bracer et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no.39) focus on the governance and CRES 
mechanisms, with some special focus on community involvement. The final paper by 
Scherr et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no.40) presents a more thorough review of the 
current status of CRES mechanisms, a forward-looking analysis of the likely evolution of 
the different types of mechanisms over the next 20 years, and an analysis of the 
mechanisms with greatest potential to benefit the poor in developing countries. 
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